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EMPLOYMENT LAW

THE LIMITS OF DEFERENCE: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT REJECTS EEOC GUIDELINES ON
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE
WORKPLACE - GARCIA v. SPUN STEAK
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Garcia v. Spun Steak CO, l the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld an employer's use of a
rule which required employees to speak only English while on
the job. The court concluded that Spun Steak Company's English-only rule did not violate § 703(a)(1) of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as amended (hereinafter "Title VII")2 by discriminating against bilingual Hispanic employees on the basis of
national origin. In rendering its decision, the Ninth Circuit
rejected employees' use of § 1606.7 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission3 ("EEOC") guidelines, which would
have placed the initial burden on Spun Steak Company to

1. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (per O'Scannlain,
J., joined by Noonan, J.; Boochever, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
reh'g en banc denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
2. Throughout this article, the term "Civil Rights Act of 1964" and "Title VII"
refers to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended as it existed prior to the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
3. The EEOC is one of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988); see Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971); see also UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CML RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
at 3258-3372 (1978) (discussing the legislative background for the enforcement and
administration of Title VII) !hereinafter "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND
XI"].
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justify its rule. Instead, the court placed the initial burden on
the employees to establish a prime facie case of discrimination
by showing that the rule created a significant adverse impact.
Spun Steak represents a return to the Ninth Circuit's earlier
approach of requiring an employee challenging an English-only
rule to establish a prima facie case. 4
This comment will show that the court's holding in Spun
Steak, while consistent with Congressional intent and prior
judicial policy, failed to provide the most compelling reason for
rejecting the EEOC guideline, namely that the guideline violates both judicial policy and the plain language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, both of which require a plaintiff to-establish a prima facie case. 5 This comment will then show that the
court's decision in Spun Steak failed to provide the necessary
guidance to lower courts. 6 Finally, this comment will show
that by adopting an alternative approach that classifies English-only rules as facially discriminatory, courts would ease the
burden on a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case without
encountering the problems inherent in the EEOC's guideline. 7
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Spun Steak Company is a small California corporation
that produces poultry and meat products for wholesale distribution. s The company employs twenty-four Spanish-speaking
workers, most of whom are Hispanic. 9 Several non Spanishspeaking employees complained that some Spanish-speaking

4. See, e.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a bilingual disc jockey who was fired for violating a radio station's on-air
English-only policy had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact);
c.f. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (finding that the mere existence of an English-only rule had
a discriminatory impact on Hispanic employees). See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Jurado. See also notes 80-94, infra, and accompanying text for a discussion of Gutierrez.
5. See infra notes 146-164 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 169-186 and accompanying text.
8. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
9. [d. Approximately two-thirds of the company's employees are production
line workers who remove poultry and other meat products from a conveyor belt
and then package them for resale. [d.
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employees made derogatory remarks in Spanish. lO The president of the company, Kenneth Bertelson, decided that an English-only rule would enhance worker safetyll and dispel the
hostile atmosphere which apparently existed. 12 An Englishonly rule was enacted in September or October 1990. 13 In November 1990, Garcia and Buitrago were warned against speaking Spanish on the job. 14 Thereafter, they were separated
from one another on the production line for conversing in
Spanish. 15
Garcia and Buitrago (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") challenged
the company's rule 16 by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 17 Plaintiffs 18 alleged that Spun Steak's English-only rule violated

10. [d. Plaintiffs Garcia and Buitrago are fully bilingual, speaking both Spanish and English. [d.
11. Appellees disputed this assertion, claiming that the safety of the workers
was never an issue but only a post-hoc justification for the rule. See Appellees'
Answering Brief at 5, Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (No.
91-16733).
12. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483. Spun Steak received complaints that Garcia
and Buitrago made derogatory remarks in Spanish about African-American and
Chinese-American employees. [d.
13. See id. The text of the rule reads:
It is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be spoken in connection with work. During
lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are obviously free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge
all of you not to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion
which may lead other employees to suffer humiliation.
[d. In addition to this policy, the company adopted a rule that forbade offensive
racial, sexual or personal remarks of any kind. [d.
14. [d. It was not clear from the record whether the company strictly enforced
its rule. [d. According to Garcia and Buitrago, some workers continued to speak
Spanish without incident. [d. The company issued written exceptions to the rule
allowing its clean-up crew, a foreman, and certain workers at the discretion of
that foreman to speak Spanish. [d. It appears that only bilingual and multilingual
speakers were affected by this rule. See id.
15. See id.
16. [d. at 1483-84.
17. [d. at 1484. First, Garcia and Buitrago filed a charges with the EEOC. [d.
at 1483. The EEOC conducted an investigation and determined that plaintiffs had
reasonable cause to believe that the company's rule violated Title VII § 703(a)(1)
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. [d. at 1483-84. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. [d. at 1483.
18. Local 115 (United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO) was also a named plaintiff, representing collectively the Spanish-speaking employees. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484. The Ninth Circuit held that
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Title VII by discriminating against them on the basis of national origin. 19 On cross motions for summary judgment, the
district court granted plaintiffs' motion and denied the
company's motion, finding that the rule disparately impacted
Hispanic workers without sufficient business justification. 20
Spun Steak appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 21
III. BACKGROUND

A. NATIONAL ORIGIN UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of
"national origin."23 Title VII does not itself provide a definition of the term "national origin.,,24 However, the United
States Supreme Court, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
CO.,25 defined national origin as the country from where a person was born or the country from which his or her ancestors came.26
Local 115 had standing to bring suit on behalf of its members. 1d.
19. 1d.
20. 1d.
21. 1d.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
23. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Civil Rights Act of 1964 definitions).
25. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
26. 1d. at 88. The Court noted that the legislative history supported this construction. 1d. at 88-89. (quoting Congressman Roosevelt's statement that national
origin, "means the country from which you or your forebears came from. 1d. at
89. (citing 110 Congo Rec. 2549 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 3, at 3179-80 (1978».
The Court also noted that the deletion of the word "ancestry" from the final
b
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In 1980, the EEOC revised its "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin. ,,27 The EEOC guidelines define national origin broadly as including an individual's, or his
or her ancestor's, place of origin; or the physical, cultural, or
linguistic characteristics of that individua1. 28
Courts have been willing to include linguistic characteristics such as a person's accent under the auspices of Title
VII. 29 However, courts have been more reluctant to include
language itself as an identifying trait of national origin. 30
B. THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Under Title VII a plaintiff may proceed under two theories
of liability: disparate impact theory or the disparate treatment
theory.31 While disparate treatment theory requires proof of
discriminatory intent, disparate impact theory does not require
proof of such intent. 32

version of § 703 was not meant to be a material change, suggesting the terms
"ancestry" and "national origin" were considered synonymous. Id. (citing H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1963».
27. 29 C.F.R. § 16.06.1 (1980). The EEOC guidelines were originally adopted
in 1970 in response to charges filed by individuals alleging that they were denied
equal employment opportunity because their last names were associated with persons, schools, churches, and other lawful organizations identified with certain na.
tional origin groups. Id.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1993). The guidelines state that the EEOC "defines
national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial
of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her
ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group."
29. See, e.g., Fragrante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that accent and national origin are inextricably intertwined in many cases), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1989); Berke v. Ohio Dept. of Public Welfare, 30
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 387 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (stating that it is reasonable to
assume that a person speaking with an accent has a national origin other than
that of the United States), af/'d, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to equate
the language a bilingual person chooses to use with national origin), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
31. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1987). See also
§ 1606.2 of the EEOC guidelines which provide in part: "[tlhe Title VII principles
of disparate treatment and adverse impact equally apply to national origin discrimination." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.2 (1993).
32. Watson, 487 U.S. at 988.
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Disparate Impact

The United States Supreme Court first advanced the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power CO. 33 Disparate
impact claims arise when facially neutral employment practices34 affect a group protected under Title VII more harshly
than another group and cannot be justified by business necessity.35 Whether or not an employer intended to discriminate is
irrelevant under the disparate impact theory.3s In order to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that a
particular facially neutral employment policy or practice has a
significant discriminatory impact on the protected group to
which the plaintiff belongs. 37 In a typical disparate impact
33. 401 u.s. 424 (1971).
34. Courts generally have defined the meaning of neutrality broadly, to include
all employment policies and practices that do not specifically mention a class covered by Title VII. See STEPHEN SHULMAN & CHARLES ABERNATHY, THE LAw OF
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT, 2-12 to 2-14 (1990) (describing the various
selection criteria and employment requirements the courts have analyzed using the
Griggs analysis).
Courts generally have been willing to define English-only rules as facially
neutral. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (equating an
English-only rule with a rule barring employees from smoking), cert. denied 449
U.S. 1113 (1981). This view has been subject to criticism. One commentator has
stated that the full impact of an English-only rule will fall exclusively on members
of protected groups whose primary language is not English. Juan F. Perea, Eng~
lish·only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265, 289-90 (1990) (citing Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 298-99 (1971)). Perea argues that an
English-only rule should not be described as "facially neutral," but instead be the
"functional equivalent" of national origin discrimination. [d. at 289-90.
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977). By definition, disparate impact cases are concerned with discrimination
against a group or class of persons. See generally SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra
note 34, at 2-11 to 2-12.
36. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures . . . that operate as 'built in
headwinds' for minority groups . . . ." [d.
37. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
codified the burden placed on a plaintiff to make the prima facie case of disparate
impact. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to provide that:
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact. . . the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact,
except that if the party can demonstrate to the court that
the elements of a respondent's decision making process
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/7

6

Cooperider and Wiss: Employment Law

1995]

EMPLOYMENT LAW

125

claim, the plaintiff will use comparative statistics38 to show
that the employment policy adversely affected the protected
class. Generally, courts determine what constitutes significant
discriminatory impact on a case-by-case basis. 39
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden of production40 shifts to the defen-

making process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1991).
38. For a discussion of the role statistics play in virtually all disparate impact
cases, see generally, BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 1331-1391 (2nd ed. 1983). See also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET
AL., 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 166-81 (2nd ed. 1988) (examining the
various mathematical models used in disparate impact claims).
39. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN supra note 38, at 98-99. See also Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 996 n.3 (1988) "At least at this stage of the law's
development we believe that such a case-by-case approach properly reflects our
recognition that statistics 'come in infinite variety and . . . their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.'" [d. (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977» (ellipses in original).
40. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, both the burdens of production and
persuasion shift to the defendant. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends § 703 of Title VII to
provide:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title only if(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged business practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration
described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(k)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991). "Demonstrate" is defined as meeting
both the burdens of production and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (Supp. III
1991).
It is not clear whether the court in Spun Steak followed the law as it existed prior to, or subsequent to, the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The effective date of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was November 21, 1991. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(n). However, the Act was silent as to whether it was to apply to cases pending
before the courts on that date. See generally CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION xix-xxxiii (2nd ed. supp. 1992) (discussing the evidence
for and against the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to pending cases).
The plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination against Spun Steak with the EEOC
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dant to demonstrate a business necessity for the challenged
employment practice. 41 Title VII does not define "business
necessity." The federal courts have applied a number of different interpretations to "business necessity" or "job relatedness.,,42

on May 6 1991. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483. Both Parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgement on September 6, 1991. Id. at 1484. The district court filed its
decision in favor of the plaintiffs on October 23, 1991. Garcia v. Spun Steak, C-911941 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16484 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1991).
In two recent decisions the Supreme Court ruled that provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 do not apply retroactively. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the Court held that § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
dealing with remedies in cases of intentional discrimination, did not apply to cases
arising before its enactment. Id. at 1505-08. In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994), the Court held that § 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
defining the term "make and enforce contracts," did not apply retroactively. Id. at
1518-20.
While neither case dealt with the particular provisions that would be applicable in a disparate impact action, the cases do indicate that the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as it existed prior to the passage of the 1991 amendments is the controlling law in Spun Steak. If the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to Spun
Steak, then the controlling law would be Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989). Here, only the burden of producing evidence shifts to the defendant. Id. at 659-60. Whether the burden that shifts to the employer is the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of producing evidence was open to interpretation before Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion) (stating that the burden that shifts is the burden of production). This view
was later adopted by the mlijority of the Court in Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 65960. Prior to Watson, the nature of the burden in a disparate impact case was an
open question. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 1328-29 (discussing the
pre-Watson analysis). See generally Samuel R. Zuck, Shifting Burdens of Proof
Under Disparate Impact Analysis: Conflict and Problems of Characterization, 27
DUQ. L. REV. 535 (1989).
41. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47. The respondent may either attack the
plaintiffs showing of disparate impact or show that the employment practice is
justified by business necessity. SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 34, at 43-44.
42. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 ("manifest relationship;" "demonstrable
relationship"); Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977) ("A discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient
job performance to survive a Title VII challenge"); see generally SCHLEI, supra note
38, at 1328-30 n.141 (listing various Supreme Court and circuit court cases and
their respective interpretations of business necessity). See also Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under
Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979) (discussing lower courts interpretation of
the Griggs standard). Chandler argues that "[t)he theoretical underpinnings of the
business necessity defense, the legislative history of Title VII, and the Supreme
Court's interpretations of that history all suggest that business necessity means
nothing more than legitimate business purpose." Id. at 933. Cf. Watson, 487 U.S.
at 998 (holding that the defendant met its burden of producing evidence that its
employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons).
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Finally, once a defendant has satisfied his burden of demonstrating business necessity, the plaintiff must be afforded an
opportunity to show that other employment practices, without
similar discriminatory effects, would serve the employer's legitimate business interest. 43 Such a showing would demonstrate
that the employer's practice was merely a "pretext" for discrimination. 44

2.

Disparate Treatment

Disparate treatment claims arise when, the employer
treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 45 In disparate
treatment claims proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment."46
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,47 the Supreme
Court established the order of proof in a disparate treatment
claim. First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 4s The plaintiff need
only produce evidence to raise an inference of discrimination. 49 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
43. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973».
44. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
45. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
46. Id.
47. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
48. Id. at 802. The Court in McDonnell Douglas set out a four part test for
indirectly making out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff
must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job which the employer was
seeking applicants, (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected, and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court elaborated: "The facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above the prima facie proof
required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
See generally SeHLE! & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 13-22 (discussion of
the disparate treatment theory).
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate
either a legitimate non-discriminatory reason50 or a bona fide
occupational qualification for the discriminatory treatment. 51
Once the defendant has satisfied this burden, the plaintiff
must be afforded an opportunity to show that the defendant's
stated reason was a pretext for a discriminatory motive. 52
Most cases are decided at the pretext stage. 53 The plaintiff
may show pretext through direct evidence of the defendant's
motive, or the court may infer discriminatory intent through
plaintiff's use of statistical or comparative evidence. 54
C.

ENGLISH-ONLY RULES IN THE WORKPLACE

In December of 1980, the EEOC promulgated its current
national origin guidelines on the subject of English-only rules
in the workplace. 55 Section 1606.7 of the EEOC's guidelines

50. [d. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
The Court in Burdine held that "[tJhe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff." [d. at 253.
51. Section 703(e) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to admit or employ any individual . . . on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
52. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
53. SeHLE! & GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 14.
54. [d. at 14-15.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980). The EEOC stated that it "is revising its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin to clarify them and to specifically inform the public of unlawful employment practices which discriminate on
the basis of national origin." Section 1606.7 provides:
A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all
times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from
speaking their primary language or the language they
speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's
employment opportunities on the basis of national origin.
It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation
and intimidation based on national origin which could
result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/7

10

Cooperider and Wiss: Employment Law

1995]

EMPLOYMENT LAW

129

creates a rebuttable presumption that English-only rules in the
workplace violate Title VII. 56 English-only rules are upheld
only if employers can show a business necessity justifying the
enactment of such rules. 57 Therefore, under the EEOC's
scheme, a plaintiff need only show the existence of an English
only rule in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
1.

Fifth Circuit Case Law: Garcia v. Gloor

Section 1606.7 was promulgated by the EEOC partly in
response to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion upholding
the validity of an English-only rule in the workplace. 58 In

the Commission will presume that such a rule violates
Title VII and will closely scrutinize it. . . . An employer
may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in
English at certain times where the employer can show
that the rule is justified by business necessity . . . . It is
common for individuals whose primary language is not
English to inadvertently change from speaking English to
speaking their primary language. Therefore, if an employer believes it has a business necessity for a speak-English-only rule at certain times, the employer should inform
its employees of the general circumstances when speaking
only in English is required and of the consequences of
violating the rule . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980)
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b). According to the EEOC, an example of business
necessity might be "where safety requires that all communications be in English
so that everyone can closely follow a particular task, such as, surgery or drilling
of oil wells or where a salesperson is attending to English-speaking customers." 45
Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980).
58. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635. According to the EEOC:
As the Court noted in Garcia v. Gloor, 616 F.2d 264, 266
n.l (5th Cir. 1980), the Commission's previous Guidelines
did not give any standards for testing employer rules
which prohibit the use of languages other than English.
The purpose of § 1606.7 is to provide this guidance. The
Commission's concern is to prevent employers from imposing speak English-only rules, as arbitrary and oppressive
terms and conditions of employment, on people who come
from non English-speaking backgrounds in order to deprive them of an equal employment opportunity for jobs
they are otherwise fully qualified to perform.
Id.
For a discussion on the history of EEOC guidelines dealing with Englishonly rules and the history of English-only rules case law, see Robert R. Oliva,
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Garcia v. Gloor,59 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a lumber company violated Title VII by discharging a
bilingual employee for disregarding its English-only rule.

Gloor Lumber and Supply Company enacted a rule requiring its employees to speak English unless the employees were
assisting non English-speaking customers.60 Gloor Lumber
discharged Hector Garcia, a bilingual salesperson of MexicanAmerican descent, for violating the rule after he responded to
a question from another employee in Spanish. 61 Garcia sued
claiming that the rule disparately impacted Spanish-speaking
employees by denying them a privilege of employment enjoyed
by English-speaking employees, namely speaking in the language that is most comfortable to them. 62
The district court ruled in favor of the employer. 63 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the employer's use of the English-only rule, stating that "there is no disparate impact if the
rule is one that the affected employee can readily observe and
nonobservance is a matter of individual preference."64 The
court compared the English-only rule to a rule that prohibits
smoking in the workplace. 65 The court stated that "[Title VII]
would not condemn that rule merely because it is shown that
most of the employees of one race smoke, most of the employees of another do not and it is more likely that a member of
the race more addicted to tobacco would be disciplined."66
In analyzing whether Title VII prohibits English-only rules
English-Only Rules In The Workplace: The Ninth Circuit Attempts to Redefine The
Parameters, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 99 (1990) (discussing the evolution of
English-only rules administrative law, case law and administrative promulgations).
59. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
60. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266. Several employees who only spoke Spanish were
exempt from the policy. See id.
61. Id. The court noted that while Garcia was not discharged merely for violating the English-only rule, "[tlhe record would support a finding that Mr.
Garcia's use of Spanish was a significant factor and therefore, rather than remand
for a determination by the trial court, we will assume for present purposes that it
was." Id. at 268.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 266.
64. Id. at 270.
65. Id.
66. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
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in the workplace, the Gloor court noted that no EEOC guideline addressed the matter.67 The Gloor court upheld the
employer's rule and the decision to discharge Garcia for violating the rule. 68 The EEOC responded by promulgating §
1606.7.69
2.

Ninth Circuit Case Law

In 1987, seven years after the Gloor case, the Ninth Circuit, in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,70 addressed the issue of
whether an employer violated Title VII by discharging an employee for speaking Spanish. 71 In that case, the program director of a local radio station requested that a bilingual disc jockey, Valentine Jurado, use some Spanish while broadcasting on
the air. 72 A consultant for the radio station determined that

67. [d. at 268 n.1. The Fifth Circuit stated:
While the EEOC has considered in specific instances
whether a policy prohibiting the speaking of Spanish in
normal interoffice contacts discriminates on the basis of
national origin, . . . it has adopted neither a regulation
stating a standard for testing such language nor any
general policy, presumed to be derived from the statute,
prohibiting them. We therefore approach the problem on
the basis of the statute itself and the case law.
[d.
68. [d. at 272. ("We hold only that an employer's rule forbidding a bilingual
employee to speak anything but English in public areas while on the job is not
discrimination based on national origin as applied to a person fully capable of
speaking English . . . .").
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1993). Whether and to what extent this guideline is
consistent with the Gloor court's analysis is not entirely clear. The EEOC states
that § 1606.7 is consistent with Gloor.
Section 1606.7 does not conflict with the Gloor decision.
Gloor did not involve a speak English-only rule which was
applied at all times. Neither did the facts in Gloor involve a bilingual employee whose primary language was
not English. In the Court's view, Mr. Garcia, who spoke
both English and Spanish, failed to prove that Spanish
was his primary language.
45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issues presented in Gloor since the promulgation of § 1606.7.
70. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. See Jurado, 813 F.2d 1408-09. Jurado advanced both disparate treatment
and disparate impact theories to support his claim. See id. at 1409 for the court's
discussion of Jurado's disparate treatment claim; see also id. at 1412 for the
court's discussion of Jurado's disparate impact claim.
72. [d. at 1408.
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Jurado's use of Spanish on the air did not achieve the goals set
out by management (i.e., to increase the target audience) and
that Jurado's use of Spanish on the air confused some listeners.73 A new program director told Jurado to stop using Spanish on the air.74 Jurado sued, claiming, among other things,
that the radio station discriminated against him on the basis
of national origin by discharging him when he refused to com. ply with the order.75 The district court granted the radio
station's motion for summary judgment.76
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Jurado's disparate impact claim by stating that
"[t]he district court found Jurado's only basis for a disparate
impact claim was the English-only order somehow
disproportionately disadvantaged Hispanics. The court found
this theory was without merit as applied to Jurado because
Jurado was fluently bilingual and could easily conform to the
order.'m The court cited Garcia v. Gloor for support. 7S
Given the court's use of Gloor in Jurado, it appeared that
the Ninth Circuit had adopted the Fifth Circuit's rationale for
upholding English-only rules in the workplace. 79 However, in
1988, the Ninth Circuit, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,SO
began moving away from the Gloor rationale and towards the
rationale adopted in the EEOC guidelines.
In Gutierrez, which was subsequently vacated as moot by
the Supreme Court,St the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
73. 1d.
74. 1d.
75. See id. at 1408-09. Jurado's disparate treatment claim had several bases.
One basis for was that the radio station permitted a white disc jockey, Rick Dees,
to use Spanish on the air while prohibiting Jurado from doing the same. 1d. at
1410. Another basis was a comment that the consultant made when suggesting
that Jurado's bilingual format be eliminated suggesting the program was "preoccupied with ethnicity to a frightening degree." 1d.
76. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409.
77. 1d. at 1412.
78.1d.
79. See id.
80. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
81. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. at 1016. Plaintiff, Alva Gutierrez, had left her job with
the county clerk and had settled out of court for $85,000 in damages, attorney
fees and other costs. L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, at B2. Judges for the Municipal

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/7

14

Cooperider and Wiss: Employment Law

1995]

EMPLOYMENT LAW

133

whether an English-only rule instituted by the Municipal
Court violated Title VII by discriminating against its Hispanic
employees on the basis of national origin. 82 In that case, the
Municipal Court promulgated an English-only rule forbidding
"employees to speak any language other than English except
when acting as translators."83 Gutierrez, a bilingual translator who worked for the court, sued for injunctive relief. 84 The
district court granted Gutierrez's request for a preliminary
injunction. 85
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
order enjoining the Municipal Court from enforcing the rule. 86
The court began by noting that "the cultural identity of certain
minority groups is tied to the use of their primary
tongue, ... "87 and that "[t]he mere fact that an employee is
bilingual does not eliminate the relationship between his primary language and the culture that is derived from his national origin."88 The court then expressed its concern that "because language and accents are identifying characteristics,
rules which have a negative effect on bilinguals, individuals
with accents, or non-English speakers, may be mere pretexts
for intentional national origin discrimination."89

Court then appealed to the United State8 Supreme Court, petitioning that the case
should be vacated on procedural grounds. L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989, at B2.
82. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d 1031. Gutierrez advanced both a disparate treatment
and a disparate impact theory to support her claim. Id. at 1036-37.
83. Id. at 1036. The text of the rule provided that "[tlhe English language
shall be spoken by all court employees during regular work hours while attending
to assigned work duties, unless an employee is translating for the non-Englishspeaking public. This rule does not apply to employees while on their lunch hour
or work breaks." Id. at 1037. The municipal court claimed that it adopted this
rule in order to promote racial harmony, to prevent disruption, to facilitate supervision, and to uphold a policy expressed in an amendment to the California Constitution that declared English the official language of state business. Id. at 104243. See Cal. Const. art III, § 6.
84. Id. at 1036. In addition to injunctive relief, Gutierrez requested monetary
damages and attorney's fees. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1045.
87. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. (citing James Harvey Domengeaux, Comment,
Native Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REv. 1151, 1165-67
(1986».
88. Id. (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 361-69, 376-77 (1986))
89. Id. (citing McArthur, Worried About Something Else, 60 INT'L J. Soc. LANGUAGE 87, 90-91 (1986».

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7

134

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:119

After citing the EEOC guideline, the court agreed "that
English-only rules generally have an adverse impact on protected groups and that they should be closely scrutinized."go
The court further stated that the EEOC guidelines, "by requiring that a business necessity be shown before a limited English-only rule may be enforced, properly balance the
individual's interest in speaking his primary language and any
possible need of the employer to ensure that in particular circumstances only English shall be spoken. "91 The court adopted the EEOC's business necessity test as "the proper standard
for determining the validity of limited English-only rules. "92
However, in adopting the EEOC's business necessity test,
the Gutierrez court was forced to recharacterize Jurado by
stating that "[t]he Jurado rule was considerably more restricted than and bore little or no resemblance, either in purpose or
effect, to the edict of the Municipal Court judges. The Jurado
rule was clearly a reasonable one that met the business necessity test . ... "gs Thus, Jurado, according to the Gutierrez court,
became a case where the employer met its burden of showing
business necessity.94
Although the Supreme Court vacated Gutierrez as moot,
Gutierrez still represented the Ninth Circuit's last word on

90. Id. at 1040.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. Judge Kozinski, dissenting from the denial of rehearing Gutierrez en
bane, wrote:
Faced with the insuperable problem of Jurado, the
Gutierrez panel deftly recharacterized it as a case where
the English-only rule 'met the business necessity test,' 838
F.2d at 1041 . . . . Jurado, of course, said no such thing.
Close examination of the two short paragraphs quoted
[where the court dealt with the disparate impact claim in
Jurado) reveals that the words 'business necessity' did not
find their way into Jurado's discussion of the issue. To
the contrary, Jurado relied exclusively on Garcia v. Gloor,
[618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980}) which rejected the business
necessity test. In ham-handed fashion, the Gutierrez panel
throws Jurado's rationale out the window and substitutes
its own.
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of rehearing en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation added).
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English-only rules in the workplace. When the district court's
decision in Spun Steak was appealed, the question was whether the panel would follow the Gutierrez court's rationale or the
Jurado court's rationale.
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A. THE MAJORITY
The majority first addressed the threshold issue of whether disparate impact claims may be brought under § 703(a)(1),
concluding that such claims may be brought under § 703(a)(1).
The court next addressed whether plaintiffs established a prima facie case. Finally, the court examined three arguments
advanced by the plaintiffs and concluded that plaintiffs failed
to establish a prima facie case. 95
1.

Whether Disparate Impact Claims May Be Brought Under
§ 703(a)(1)

The Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak first considered whether
a disparate impact claim96 could be brought under Title VII §
703(a)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as amended. 97 The court

95. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en bane
denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 2726 (1994).
96. See supra notes 28·38 and accompanying text for a discussion on disparate
impact.
97. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485. See supra note 40 for the text of § 703(a).
The court noted that traditionally a disparate impact claim is brought under Title
VII section 703(a)(2) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. [d. This is chiefly due to the
language of the statute. The court stated:
[Tlhe cases in which we have concluded that plaintiff has
proved discrimination based on a disparate impact theory
have all involved plaintiffs who claimed that they were
denied employment opportunities as the result of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers that excluded memo
bers of a protected group from being hired or promoted.
[d.

Since "employment opportunities" is language that is extracted from section
703(a)(2), such claims were logically thought to arise under this section. [d. Garcia
and Buitrago argued that the English·only rule imposed a burdensome term or
condition on their employment and also denied them a privilege accorded to other
employees, namely monolingual speakers of English. [d. The court reasoned that
terms and conditions of employment does not fall within the ambit of section
703(a)(2), but rather within the ambit of section 703(a)(1). [d.
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noted that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court
had expressly considered this issue. 98 The Ninth Circuit held
that a disparate impact claim could be brought under §
703(a)(1), stating that there is "no reason to restrict the application of the disparate impact theory to the denial of employment opportunities under § 703(a)(2)."99 Since the issue of
whether a disparate impact claim can be brought under §
703(a)(1) involves statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit
partially justified its holding by noting that "[t]he Supreme
Court has instructed that the language of § 703(a)(1) is to be
interpreted broadly."loo
Next, the court examined whether the language of §
703(a)(1) could support a disparate impact claim.lol The court
cited Lynch v. Freeman,102 a Sixth Circuit decision, to support
its determination that disparate impact claims could be sustained under § 703(a)(1).103

98. Id. The court was in error; the Ninth Circuit had previously decided
whether a disparate impact claim may be brought under section 703(a)(1). In May
1983, the court decided Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). The Ninth Circuit held that "[tlhis is an
unusual disparate impact case because it alleges a violation of § 703(a)(1) of the
Act: discrimination with respect to 'compensations, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.'" Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1494 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the disparate impact analysis
was appropriate. Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1494.
99. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
100. Id. The Ninth Circuit drew this inference from a statement that the Supreme Court made in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), a sexual harassment case which involved the issue of whether a victim of sexual harassment who filed a claim pursuant to Title VII § 703(a)(1) could recover for psychological damages. The Court reasoned that remuneration under Title VII was not
limited to economic damages since "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment.m Id. at 64.
101. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
102. 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987). In Lynch, a female construction worker, who
was terminated from her job, sued her employer contending, among other things,
that his failure to provide properly sanitized toilet facilities discriminated against
her by creating work conditions that adversely impacted female employees. Id. at
386-87. The employer contended that any claim involving discrimination with respect to work conditions falls within the language of § 703(a)(1), which requires
discriminatory intent to be shown. Id. The Sixth Circuit upheld the female
worker's disparate impact claim. Id. at 389.
103. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485-86 (citing Lynch, 817 F.2d 380) ("We are
satisfied that a disparate impact claim may be based upon a challenge to a practice or policy that has a significant adverse impact on the 'terms, conditions, or
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Prima Facie Case

The Ninth Circuit next considered whether the Spanishspeaking employees established their prima facie case. 104 The
court stated that under disparate impact analysis, a plaintiff
must "do more than merely raise an inference of discrimination
before the burden shifts."105 The court noted that in a typical
disparate impact case, the plaintiff "proves discriminatory
impact by showing statistical disparities between the number
of protected class members in the qualified applicant group
and those in the relevant segment of the workforce.,,106 However, the court recognized that when the "alleged disparate impact is on the conditions, terms or privileges of employment ... determining whether the protected group has been
adversely affected may depend on subjective factors not easily
quantified. "107 The court concluded that although proving the
alleged impact may be more difficult under these circumstances, this fact "does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving disparate impact.'Hos The mere assertion that the
English-only rule harms members of the protected group is
insufficient. l09
In addition, the majority fashioned a four-part test to
determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie
case. The test provides that in order to establish a prima facie
case a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of adverse
effects of the policy; (2) that the impact of the policy is on
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the protected
class; (3) that the adverse effects are significant; and (4) that
the employee population in general is not affected by the policy
to the same degree. 11o
The Spanish-speaking employees advanced three arguprivileges' of the employment of a protected group under section 703(a)(1).").
104. [d. at 1486.
105. [d.
106. [d. The court noted that while such statistics are difficult to gather, at
least the evidence of discrimination is quantifiable. [d.
107. [d.
108. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
109. [d.
110. [d.
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ments in order to establish their prima facie case, each of
which the court examined and rejected in turn. First, the
Spanish-speaking employees argued that the rule denied them
the "ability to express their cultural heritage on the job."lll
Second, they argued that the rule denied them "a privilege of
employment that is enjoyed by monolingual speakers of English."112 Third, they argued that the rule "create[d] an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation. "113
The court quickly dismissed the first argument by noting
that Title VII "does not protect the ability of workers to express their cultural heritage at the workplace. 114 Title VII is
concerned only with disparities in the treatment of workers; it
does not confer substantive privileges."115
The court dismissed the second argument by noting that
while the ability to converse on the job is a privilege of employment,11S the very nature of a privilege is that it is defined at
the discretion of the employer. 1l7 The employer may define
the privilege either broadly or narrowly. us Where the employer chooses to define the privilege narrowly by enacting an
English-only rule, employees who are bilingual cannot be adversely impacted since the language that they use at a particular time is, by definition, a matter of choice. 119 Thus, the
court reasoned that while the rule may inconvenience some
bilingual employees, Title VII was not meant to protect against
policies that merely inconvenience members of a protected
class. 120 Rather, "Title VII protects against only those policies
that have a significant impact."121 However, the court ob-

111. [d. at 1486-87.
112. [d. at 1487.
113. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
114. [d.
115. [d.
116. [d. The court noted that such a privilege may be a significant privilege for
workers who work on the assembly-line. [d.
117. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
118. [d. For example, an employer may "proscribe certain topics as inappropriate during working hours or may even forbid the use of certain words, such as
profanity." [d.
119. [d.

120. [d. at 1487-88.
121. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488 (emphasis in original).
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served that the very existence of an English-only rule might
have an adverse impact on a speaker who could not speak
English. 122
The Ninth Circuit addressed the third argument by noting
that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,123 held that "an abusive work environment may, in some circumstances, amount to a condition of
employment .... "124 However, the Ninth Circuit characterized Meritor as stating that the hostile work environment
"must be pervasive before an employee has a Title VII claim
under a hostile environment theory."125 Although the Spanish-speaking employees urged the court to adopt a per se rule
that English-only rules will always create a hostile work environment, the Ninth Circuit declined to do SO.126 Rather, the
court viewed the inquiry as a question of fact "for which a per
se rule is particularly inappropriate."127 Any inquiry "must
look to the totality of the circumstances in the particular factual context in which the claim arises."I26 The court noted that
conclusory statements that the rule has contributed to an atmosphere of isolation, inferiority and intimidation are not

122. [d. The court remanded the case as to one employee who could not speak
any English in order to determine whether the existence of the rule adversely
impacted her. [d. at 1490. The court stated that this is a question of fact for
which summary judgment is inappropriate. [d.
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
124. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66). Section
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights act of 1964 forbids an employer from discriminating
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
In Meritor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee
may bring a claim arising under Title VII § 703(a)(1) for sexual harassment where
an employer's conduct amounts to a work condition by creating a hostile and offensive environment with which the employee must contend. Mentor, 477 U.S. at
66. In that case, a bank employee sued her employer contending that unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and verbal suggestions created an
offensive environment that amounted to a condition of employment for purposes of
Title VII. [d. at 60. The Court held that such conduct where the purpose or effect
of it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, may properly be the basis of a Title VII § 703(a)(1) claim. See id. at 66.
125. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
126. [d. The Spanish-speaking employees relied on EEOC guideline section
1606.7(a) for their support. [d. See supra note 55 for the text of this guideline.
127. [d.
128. [d.
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sufficient. 129 Since the Spanish-speaking employees offered no
evidence apart from conclusory statements to show that the
policy created a hostile work environment, the court ruled that
they did not establish a prima facie case .130
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit rejected the employees' use
of an EEOC Guideline that enables a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case merely by showing the existence of an English-only rule. l3l Although the court noted that the guidelines
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,"132 the majority added that "we are not bound by the
guidelines."133 Further, the court stated that it would not
defer to "an administrative construction of a statute where
there are 'compelling indications that it is wrong.",134

129. Id.
130. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. According to the court, "the bilingual
employees have not raised a genuine issue of material fact that the effect is so
pronounced as to amount to a hostile environment." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986».
133. Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973».
134. Id. (quoting Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94-95).
In its decisions, the United States Supreme Court has enumerated a number of factors which are relevant in determining whether to defer to EEOC guidelines. First, the court looks to the language of the statute to determine whether
the guideline is in accord. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88 ("[T]he plain language of the
statute supports the result reached by the Court of Appeals [refusing to defer to
EEOC guidelines]."). Second, the court examines legislative history to further interpret the language of the statute. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (finding the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and its legislative history supporting the EEOC's construction of section
703(h»; Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88-89 ("The statute's legislative history, though
quite meager, supports [the EEOC's] construction.").
Third, the courts may, if necessary, examine whether the guideline is consistent with historical and current federal policy. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 89-9l.
Fourth, courts can examine the guidelines' consistency with prior and subsequent case law. See Gutierrez v.Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The Gutierrez court found that the
EEOC guidelines regarding English-only rules conflicted with the prior case of
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 133 (1981). As
such the Gutierrez court found that the EEOC guidelines did not constitute established law. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1049. The court stated:
We need not decide in this case, whether, in the absence
of decisional law, EEOC guidelines and decisions can
constitute clearly established law. Here, judicial precedent
existed and it appears to have been inconsistent, at least
in part, with the guidelines. If the contrary judicial precedent had been issued subsequent to the guidelines, there
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According to the Ninth Circuit, nothing in the plain language of Title VII § 703(a)(1) supported the EEOC interpretation of the statute. 135 The majority justified its conclusion by
stating that the enactment of the statute could not have been
accomplished without the "substantial support from legislators
in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of
private business."136 Finally, the court noted that "Congress
intended a balance to be struck in preventing discrimination
and preserving the independence of the employer, ... the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in a disparate impact
case must prove the alleged discriminatory effect before the
burden shifts to the employer.,,137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, the Guideline "contravenes that policy by presuming that an English-only policy has a disparate impact in the
absence of proof. "138

is no question that we would hold that the guidelines do
not 'clearly establish' the law. Although the answer is not
as certain when the guidelines are issued after a decision,
where that decision has been rendered by a federal circuit
court and the subsequently issued guidelines remain
largely untested, we think it appropriate to reach the
same conclusion. Thus, we hold that in the case before us
the EEOC guidelines did not serve to clearly establish the
law regarding the validity of English-only rules.
ld. (emphasis in original).
Finally, the court may also look to the process by which the EEOC passed
its guidelines, examining "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and) its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements."
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140'(1944) (cited with approval in General
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976»; see EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991).
In Gilbert, the Court found that the EEOC guideline did not fare well under the Skidmore standards. One factor used in the Court's analysis was that the
guideline was not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, but was instead
promulgated in 1972, eight years after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142.
135. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
136. ld. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979». The court further justified this policy argument by stating that "[i)ntemal
affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to
the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices." ld. at
1490 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88 Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2516) (Statement of William M. McCulloch) (quoted in part in
Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 206).
137. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
138. ld.
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THE DISSENT

Judge Boochever disagreed with the majority's rejection of
the EEOC Guideline, 139 and would have deferred to the
EEOC's expertise in construing the Act.14D The dissent noted
that although an EEOC guideline "[is] entitled to somewhat
less weight than those promulgated by an agency with Congressionally delegated rulemaking authority,"141 it is nevertheless "entitled to 'great deference' in the absence of 'compelling indications that it is wrong.,"142 Here, Judge Boochever
found no such compelling indications. 143 Judge Boochever
would have deferred to the EEOC guideline and upheld the
district court's determination that plaintiffs had established
their prima facie case. 144 In addition, Judge Boochever would
have remanded the case to establish whether the company had
a business justification for instituting the English-only
rule. 145
V. CRITIQUE
This critique will (1) show that the EEOC Guideline relied
upon by plaintiffs is inconsistent with congressional intent and
judicial policy; (2) show that the court's opinion in Spun Steak
failed to provide the guidance necessary to assist lower courts
in determining how plaintiffs may establish their prima facie
139. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
140. [d. In fact, the dissent noted that the difficulty of establishing a prima
facie case by using subjective factors alone and without making conclusory statements would be very difficult. [d. Boochever stated that this "may well have been
one of the reasons for the promulgation of the guideline. On the other hand, it
should not be difficult for an employer to give specific reasons for the policy, such
as the safety reasons advanced in this case." [d.
141. [d. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976».
142. [d. at 1490-91 (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95
(1973».
143. [d. at 1491. Judge Boochever found that the lack of directly supporting
language in either § 703(a)(1) or the legislative history of Title VII, relied on by
the majority, did not make the guideline inconsistent with congressional intent. [d.
144. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1491.
145. Id. However, unlike the district court, the dissent thought that whether
the company had sufficient business justification for establishing the policy provided triable issues of fact, making a motion for summary judgment inappropriate.
[d.
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case; and (3) advance an alternate approach whereby Englishonly rules would be classified as facially discriminatory, allowing claims of discrimination to be brought under the disparate
treatment theory.

A. THE EEOC GUIDELINES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL
POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In Spun Steak,146 a divided panel held that the EEOC
guideline relied upon by the plaintiffs was inconsistent with
Title VII. 147 While the court relied upon the plain
language l46 and legislative history149 of § 703(a) in reaching
its decision, it virtually ignored the most compelling reason for
rejecting the guideline, namely, that the guideline violates both
the judicial policy of requiring a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case and the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.150

146. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2726
(1994).
147. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90. Judge Boochever, dissenting in part,
would have deferred to the EEOC guideline, finding no compelling indications that
the guideline was wrong. [d. at 1490-91.
148. [d. at 1489.
149. [d. at 1489-90. Judge Reinhardt, dissenting from the decision to deny a
rehearing of Spun Steak en banc, attacked the majority's rejection of the Guideline. Reinhardt stated: "[tlhough acknowledging that only 'compelling indications'
that the Guideline was erroneous would justify rejecting it, the majority makes
only a token effort to abide by this standard, dedicating less than a page describing its 'compelling' reasons for invalidating the Guideline." Spun Steak, 13 F.3d at
299. Judge Reinhardt added that:
the Spun Steak majority cites as a reason for its decision
the absence of legislative history regarding Title VII's
applicability to English-only rules. 998 F.2d at 1490. With
this argument, the majority elevates legislative history to
a new height. Those who believe that even affirmative
legislative history is, in general, not compelling maybe
surprised to learn that its absence can be so crucial as to
constitute a basis for invalidating an agency rule. See,
e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co. ...
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (describing legislative
history as 'that last hope of lost interpretative causes,
that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction').
[d. at 300.
150. Although the majority asserted that adopting the EEOC's position would
contravene the general policy that plaintiffs must establish their prima facie cases,
the court marshalled little support to prove its proposition. The court stated that
Supreme Court's policy of requiring plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of
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Since the Supreme Court first fashioned the disparate
impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power CO. 151 in 1971, federal
courts, including the Ninth Circuit prior to Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,152 have required plaintiffs to prove significant adverse impact before the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate business justification. 153 Thus, the EEOC's burdenshifting scheme under § 1606.7 of the guidelines lD4 could be
construed as an executive agency's attempt to reshape judicial
policy.
Moreover, the EEOC guideline appears to contradict
Congress' most recent enunciation of its policy concerning
prima facie cases in disparate impact claims. Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991/55 in part, to reverse several Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the scope of civil
rights protections,156 particularly several aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.157 However, the Act also codified the standard set out in
Ward's Cove for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. 15S
discriminatory impact stemmed from Congress' desire to strike a balance between
preventing discrimination and preserving the independence of the employer. Spun
Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. Beyond quoting Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 266, a case
decided eight years after Griggs, the Ninth Circuit provided no support for their
statement that this "balance" was the reason for the policy that plaintiffs establish
a prima facie case.
151. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
152. 861 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
153. For example, in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.
1987), the Ninth Circuit dismissed Jurado's disparate impact claim for failure to
establish a prima facie case. Id. at 1412. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying
text for discussion of the facts and holding of Jurado.
154. See supra note 55 for the text of § 1606.7.
155. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
156. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2(4). See generally, Donald O. Johnson, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 469 (1992) (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions and Congress' response in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
157. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) ("[T)he employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice."). Id. at 659. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 alters the defendant's burden from that in Ward's Cove.
The Act requires the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged business practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i». The
Act defines "demonstrate" as meeting "the burdens of production and persuasion."
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 104 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m».
158. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i».
The court in Ward's Cove held that "[aJs a general matter, a plaintiff must demon-
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The pertinent part of § 105 reads: "With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate
impact ... the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate
impact .... "169 According to the 1991 Act, "demonstrate"
means to carry both the burdens of production and persuasion. lso
The EEOC guidelines, however, place the initial burden on
the employer to demonstrate business necessity before enacting
an English-only rule. 161 Under the guideline, the employee
need only prove the existence of an English-only rule before
the burden shifts/s2 the plaintiff need not persuade the court
that the English-only rule has adversely impacted a member or
members of the protected group since such rules are presumed
to create an adverse impact. l63 Thus, the guideline appears to
violate the plain language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act by bypassing the Act's requirement that a plaintiff meet his burdens
of production and persuasion in a disparate impact claim before the burden shifts to the employer. It would therefore be
reasonable to conclude that the guideline in question in Spun
Steak would be rejected under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 164

strate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that
is under attack." Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court added that the burden
of persuasion remains with the disparate impact plaintiff, and "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a
specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." Id. at 659
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988» (emphasis
in Ward's Cove).
159. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i)).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (1991).
161. See supra note 55 for the text to 29 C.F.R. -§ 1606.7.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
163. Id.
164. With regard to Title VII as it existed prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the codification of the Ward's Cove standard can be viewed as
Congressional approval of the way the Court has handled this aspect of disparate
impact claims. Since the guideline at issue runs counter to the policies set forth
by both the Supreme Court and by Congress, the majority in Spun Steak could
rightly have found "compelling indications" that the guideline was wrong.
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B. SPUN STEAK FAILED To PROVIDE GUIDANCE To LOWER
COURTS

In Spun Steak, the court focused on whether the Englishonly rule had an adverse impact on employees; and if so,
whether that impact was significant. 165 The court concluded
that an English-only rule, in and of itself, does not create a
significant adverse impact on bilingual employees. 166 The
court, however, distinguished bilingual employees from nonEnglish speaking employees by stating that "'to a person who
speaks only one tongue or to a person who has difficulty using
another language than the one spoken in his home,' an English-only rule might well have an adverse impact. "167 Therefore, the classification of employees as bilingual or other than
bilingual, becomes important because the way a court classifies
an employee is likely to affect whether or not a court will find
that the rule has significantly impacted that employee. According to the majority's view, the question turns on the facility
that the employee has with the English language. l68 The
more proficient an employee is in English, the less impact an
English-only rule will have on that employee since his ability
to exercise his privilege is not as drastically curtailed.
However, the Ninth Circuit provided no guidance on how
an employee's facility with English might be judged. It is not
clear, for example, whether proficiency in English is a fluid
concept that may change with the particular work environment
165. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. Id. The court stated:
Title VII is not meant to protect against rules that merely inconvenience some employees, even if the inconvenience falls regularly on a protected class. Rather, Title
VII protects against only those policies that have a signif- .
icant impact. The fact that an employee may have to
catch himself or herself from occasionally slipping into
Spanish does not impose a burden significant enough to
amount to the denial of equal opportunity.
Id.(emphasis in original); cf. Cox v. American Cast Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1561
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Title VII gives us no license to decide that any injury, however
insignificant, may be regarded as de minimis. AB appellant argues, '[w)hat is small
in principal is often large in principle.'") (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted», cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
167. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488.
168. Id.
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or whether it is an absolute standard that must be met regardless of the work environment. Moreover, if it is an absolute
standard, the court has not stated what level of proficiency
meets that standard. Such unanswered questions are likely to
lead to further litigation.

c.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Professor Juan F. Perea169 has observed that most courts,
when confronted with whether an English-only rule violates
Title VII, have proceeded under the assumption that such
rules are facially neutral. 170 In fact, no reported decision has
examined the validity of an English-only rule has even analyzed this assumption, let alone questioned it.l7l However,
according to Perea, this assumption has only "superficial appeal."172 Facially discriminatory policies are policies that on
their face explicitly treat people differently based upon some
prohibited classification such as race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. 173 Perea argues that English-only rules differ
"in kind from the facially neutral rules usually analyzed under
the disparate impact model," because the effects of Englishonly rules fall exclusively on members in the protected group
while the effects of facially neutral rules falls on members both
inside and outside the protected groUp.174 Perea argues that
such exclusive adverse effects coupled with the close correlation between primary language and national origin provides a
strong argument for challenging English-only rules under a
disparate treatment theory, not a disparate impact theory.175
Professor Perea has analogized English-only rules to employment practices that discriminate on the basis of pregnan-

169. Juan F. Perea, English·only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary
Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265 (1990).
170. Perea, supra note 169, at 289.
171. [d. Perea notes that no one, including the EEOC and the litigants in Gloor
or Gutierrez has challenged the assumption that English-only policies are facially
neutral. [d.
172. [d.
173. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1978).
174. Perea, supra note 169, at 289.
175. See id. at 292-93.
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cy.176 Prior to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (hereinafter "PDA") in 1978,177 the United States Supreme Court, in General Electric v. Gilbert,178 had ruled that
policies which differentiated among employees because ofpregnancy were facially neutral and did not discriminate on the
basis of sex. 179 Congress amended Title VII by enacting the
. PDA which included pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions under the definition of discrimination on the basis of
sex. 180 Congress adopted the views of several of the dissenting Justices in Gilbert. 181
According to Perea, "a correct interpretation of Title VII
requires treating characteristics that are closely correlated
with a protected characteristic the same as the explicitly protected characteristic when such characteristics are used as the
basis of discrimination that results in an exclusive adverse
effect upon a protected groUp."182 The inevitable conclusion,
as Perea notes, is that "Ulust as ... discrimination because of
pregnancy is the same as discrimination because of sex, so . . .
176. Id. at 293·94.
177. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988».
178. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
179. See id. at 136.
180. Section 701(k) of Title VII provides the following:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basi8 of pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of
this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
181. H.R. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4750.
In Gilbert, Justice Brennan stated, "Surely it offends common sense to suggest . . . that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at a minimum,
strongly 'sex related.'" Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Justice Stevens stated that "the rule at issue places the risk of absence
caused by pregnancy in a class by itself. By definition, such a rule discriminates
on the basis of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
differentiates the female from the male." Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
182. Perea, supra note 169, at 294.
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discrimination because of primary language ... is the same as
discrimination because of national origin."183
Perea's theory is not without problems. Pregnancy correlates completely with gender; only women can become pregnant. However, language is only "closely correlated" to national
origin. 184 Just how "closely correlated" a primary language is
to national origin is likely to be a matter of dispute. 185
Perea's approach, however, has several distinct advantages. First, Perea's approach would allow a plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case merely by showing the existence of an English-only rule, thereby avoiding the necessity of using subjective factors to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Second, by classifying English-only rules as per se discriminatory, and allowing them to be analyzed under the disparate
treatment theory, the problems inherent in the EEOC's burden-shifting scheme are avoided. Third, Perea's approach is
also consistent with both judicial policy and Congressional
intent. Finally, since future claims against employers will be
subject to the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991/86 Perea's
theory provides a better balance between the interests of employers and employees. Under Perea's approach, an employee
need only prove the existence of an English-only rule to establish a prima facie case. The employer's burden under Perea's
approach is also lessened since the employer need only produce
evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory alternative.

183. See id.
184. [d. at 293.
185. The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly equated primary language with national origin. The majority in Spun Steak did state that "(iJt cannot be gainsaid that
an individual's primary language can be an important link to his ethnic culture
and identity." Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487. However, the majority also stated
that it was impressed with the Gloor court's analysis. [d. at 1489. The Gloor court
noted "[nleither ... [Title VIII nor common understanding equates national origin
with the language that one chooses to speak." Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268.
186. See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
changes the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has made regarding disparate impact claims.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak properly rejected the EEOC's guideline, it failed to provide the most compelling reason for doing so. The guideline's burden-shifting
scheme is inconsistent with case law dating back to Griggs
which mandates that a plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact. Moreover, the court failed to question
the implicit assumption that English-only rules are facially
neutral. By adopting Perea's approach to English-only rules,
the court would simplify any actions challenging an employer's
English-only rule by analyzing such challenges under the disparate treatment approach. The plaintiff's burden would be
lessened to establish a prima facie case, and the burden that
would shift to the employer would only be that of production,
not production and persuasion.
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